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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2029
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MARR](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL, GOJ OFFICIALS DISCUSS THE HISTORY OF
U.S. FORCE REALIGNMENT

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt; Reasons 1.4 (B)
) and (D)

Summary

1. (S) A State-DOD delegation led by EAP A/S Kurt Campbell engaged October 12 with Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Akihisa Nagashima and officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense on the historical background on realignment of U.S. forces and plans to relocate Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. Nagashima stated that Defense Minister Kitazawa supported current Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plans, and that bilateral cooperation on three issues would help to achieve successful implementation of current realignment plans: (1) noise abatement at Kadena Air Base; (2) risk mitigation at MCAS Futenma; and, (3) establishment of environmental standards for U.S. military facilities in connection with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), to be based on an agreement not subject to U.S. Congressional approval. Members of the U.S. delegation countered Ministry of Defense (MOD) Bureau of Local Cooperation Director General Motomi Inoue's suggestion that U.S. Marines presence in Guam alone would provide sufficient deterrence capability in the region, and the airstrips at Ie and Shimoji islands might be a sufficient complement to Kadena's two runways in a contingency. They stressed that relying exclusively on Guam posed time, distance, and other operational challenges for U.S. Marines to respond expeditiously enough to fulfill U.S. treaty obligations. They also underscored that the Chinese military build-up since the 1995 formulation of FRF plans necessitated access to at least three contingency runways. MOD Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige Takamizawa suggested that the U.S. Government incorporate changes since 2006 on U.S. capabilities, war plans, and increased coordination with the Japan Self Defense Force when briefing on the continued validity of realignment plans to Japanese government officials and politicians. He also urged the U.S. Government to cooperate with the Japanese government in explaining realignment issues to the Japanese public.

2. (S) Takamizawa stressed in a lunch meeting subsequent to

the briefing (excluding Nagashima and others) that the U.S. delegation ought not to take Nagashima's assesement of current realignment plans at face value and cautioned against premature demonstration of flexibility in adjusting the realignment package to be more palatable to the DPJ Government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Director General for North American Affairs Kazuyoshi Umemoto pointed out that the DPJ Government had not yet finished crafting its decision-making process for realignment issues, as stakeholders such as Foreign Minister Okada, Okinawa State Minister Maehara, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano were each focusing on different angles. He also noted that DPJ President Ozawa might possibly involve himself in the realignment review process. Separately, in an October 13 breakfast meeting, the DCM, EAP/J Director Kevin Maher, OSD Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, and Embassy Tokyo POL-MIL Chief presented the same realignment briefing to Executive Assistants to the Prime Minister Tadakatsu Sano and Kanji Yamanouchi, stressing that the U.S. Government shared Japanese concerns on aviation safety risks, and would continue to demonstrate publicly a patient attitude on realignment even as it conveyed strong messages to the Japanese government in private on the implications on the Alliance from changes to FRF plans. End Summary.

Presentation on Realignment/FRF

¶2. (C) On October 12, EAP A/S Kurt Campbell, EAP DAS David Shear, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia Michael Schiffer led a State-DOD delegation in discussions with Parliamentary Vice-Minister Akihisa

Nagashima and a team of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials on the history of negotiations on plans to move Futenma Air Station in Okinawa to the proposed Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) site at Camp Schwab/Nago. A/S Campbell noted that the U.S. delegation aimed to provide detailed background on the FRF in support of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Government's ongoing review of U.S. force posture realignment. He elaborated that he had worked on Okinawa issues since the mid-1990s and that, for the first time in that span, prospects for significant progress had emerged. Reasons for confidence included: (1) a strong consensus within the U.S. Government and U.S. military; (2) Congressional budgetary commitment to realignment plans; and, (3) support from local elected leaders in Okinawa. A/S Campbell added that the DPJ Government had the right to review details of realignment as an integral component of the Alliance, and he offered the U.S. Government's best judgment as to the way forward. Vice-Minister Nagashima thanked the U.S. delegation and expressed hope that both sides would seize the opportunity to build a more robust relationship.

¶3. (S) The discussion shifted to an interagency-coordinated presentation by OSD Senior Japan Country Director Suzanne Basalla on the history behind FRF plans. Basalla's briefing focused on the strategic context for U.S. force posture realignment, ranging from commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty through efforts to transform the Alliance with the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). She included an explanation as to the necessity of maintaining U.S. Marine aviation capabilities in Japan and, in particular, Okinawa. The presentation then turned to reasons that the proposed consolidation of Marine and U.S. Air Force air capabilities at Kadena Air Base (now favored by several DPJ Government leaders) was unworkable, due to operational and political factors. Basalla also reviewed the rationale for the planned FRF's V-shaped runways. She concluded by discussing the continuing validity of assumptions that underlay the decision to locate the FRF at Camp Schwab on the outskirts of Nago City.

Nagashima's Response: Three Items for a Realignment Package

¶4. (S) Following Basalla's presentation, Vice-Minister

Nagashima noted that internal MOD assessments on FRF resembled conclusions drawn by U.S. Government. He added that Defense Minister Kitazawa was a "realistic person who was one of the strongest supporters" of current FRF plans among Ministers involved in the realignment review. Nagashima added that he and Kitazawa had recently visited Okinawa, where they learned of difficulties with proposals to move the FRF either off-island or out of Japan. The Vice-Minister explained that, whereas the DPJ Government had not decided its direction on realignment, bilateral cooperation on three issues would help to achieve current realignment plans. These issues included: (1) noise abatement at Kadena Air Base; (2) an "out-of-the-box" approach to risk mitigation at MCAS Futenma; and, (3) an environmental package connected to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Nagashima observed that the Okinawan people "strongly desired" progress on the third issue and that the Hatoyama Administration had a significant "environmental orientation." He elaborated that Japan wished to establish environmental standards for U.S. military facilities that would be based on an agreement not subject to U.S. Congressional approval. This agreement could use the U.S.-Germany SOFA and the U.S.-ROK environmental protocol as precedential models. Political events over the coming year would also bear upon realignment, according to Nagashima. He explained that the January 2010 Nago City mayor's election, the July Upper House election, and the November Okinawa Prefectural Governor's election would make clear "what Okinawans think on basing issues." Of these three events, the Nago City mayor's election would be critical. Nagashima

observed that the Japanese government would have to set a clear direction on the Alliance, inclusive of the three issues he mentioned, prior to the mayoral election in order to realize current realignment plans.

15. (S) A/S Campbell and DASD Schiffer responded that the U.S. Government, like the Japanese government, cared about environmental stewardship and energy efficiency. A/S Campbell pointed out that U.S. allies regarded the U.S.-Japan SOFA as the gold standard among basing agreements, and he counseled against moves to review simultaneously every aspect of the Alliance. He added, however, that the U.S. side would be able to demonstrate flexibility on the three issues raised by Nagashima if Japan were to decide that this approach to realignment were correct. He offered to take back to the U.S. Government the Japanese recommendation to work together on environmental issues, an area in which "much good could be achieved." DASD Schiffer added that there were ways to address environmental issues without SOFA revision. The U.S.-ROK process for environmental assessments and base returns, for example, stood outside the SOFA. He concluded that the U.S. Government would be willing to explore similar potential approaches with Japan and to be a good partner on the environment.

Reasons to Stay in Okinawa

16. (C) Japanese citizens often debated the reasons that the U.S. Marines remained in Okinawa, remarked Motomi Inoue, Director General of the MOD Bureau of Local Cooperation. Would not the U.S. Marine presence in Guam be sufficient to maintain deterrent credibility in East Asia and to respond to Taiwan contingencies, he asked hypothetically. Inoue noted that a military helicopter pad was under construction at Andersen Air Base in Guam, where, he believed, up to 60 rotary wing aircraft could redeploy temporarily. He commented that this facility, plus high-speed naval vessels, might enable the U.S. military to respond with sufficient speed to regional emergencies. U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) Deputy Commander Major General John Toolan explained that the Guam option presented time, distance, and other operational challenges, using the example of disaster relief. Following the recent Indonesian earthquake, U.S. Marine helicopters based in Guam would have been unable to reach disaster-hit areas, and helicopters placed on ships would have taken four days to arrive, he noted. The Marines in Okinawa, however,

had been able to self-deploy to the disaster area.

Contingencies

¶7. (C) Inoue also posed hypothetically that, if the U.S. military required three airfields in a contingency (a point raised by A/S Campbell), airstrips at Ie and Shimoji islands might be a sufficient complement to Kadena's two runways, obviating the need for the FRF at Camp Schwab. MajGen Toolan responded that the Japanese government was still assessing the needs of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) regarding airstrips, particularly in the context of China's military build-up. Until the Japanese completed that assessment, the U.S. side would have difficulty knowing the facilities that would be available for use. EAP/J Maher observed that the runways at Ie and Shimoji would not be sufficient on their own, but would require the full complement of support facilities, including for refueling and maintenance, to be useable by U.S. forces. Japanese discussion of contingency air fields often overlooks this requirement, he added. Naha Consul General Greene noted that, as Japan worked through its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), it would be important for both sides to de-conflict expectations on Shimoji options.

¶9. (S) A contingency would dictate that all U.S.-controlled airfields in Japan be used at maximum capacity, not just two

or three, remarked DASD Schiffer. He elaborated that there might be contingencies related not just to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ), but also to the defense of Japan itself. This possibility was clear in war plans that the U.S. side had earlier provided to select Japanese officials, and Schiffer offered to provide those briefs again to appropriate counterparts. He also related this issue back to realignment, noting that the redeployment of Marines in their entirety to Guam would not give the U.S. military the flexibility and speed necessary to meet its Security Treaty obligations to Japan. MajGen Toolan added that the briefs cited by DASD Schiffer required additional information from the Japanese government, an issue that could be addressed through improved bilateral planning.

¶10. (S) The dramatic increase in China's military capabilities necessitated access to at least three runways in a contingency, noted A/S Campbell. In the 1990s, it had been possible to implement contingency plans for South Korea and China using only two runways in Okinawa, Naha and Kadena. The most significant change between 1995 (when the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plans for the relocation Futenma Air Base had been formulated) and 2009 was the build-up of Chinese military assets, explained A/S Campbell. This fact, which was now a driver of U.S. military assessments for the region, was implicit in Basalla's presentation and could not be discussed publicly for obvious reasons, he added.

Incorporating Changes

¶11. (C) DG Takamizawa recommended that the U.S. briefing on the FRF should incorporate changes since 2006 regarding U.S. capabilities and war plans. New factors, such as the planned deployment of MV-22 (Osprey) aircraft, high-speed vessels, and increased military coordination with the Japanese side, should be taken into account in explaining the continuing validity of realignment plans. As a second point, he noted that the DPJ Government placed a premium on information-sharing and transparency. The understanding of government officials and politicians is not enough, said Takamizawa. The Japanese government also sought cooperation from the U.S. Government in clarifying the contents of realignment to the Japanese public.

MOD and MOFA Read-out on the Presentation

¶12. (S) In a private read-out over lunch immediately following the FRF presentation, MOD DG Takamizawa cautioned the U.S. side not to take excessive comfort in Nagashima's assessment of current realignment plans. The Vice-Minister had been much tougher in his questions on FRF during internal MOD sessions, and he was aware that A/S Campbell had spoken about realignment the previous evening with State Minister for Okinawa Seiji Maehara (a proponent of Kadena consolidation). Takamizawa added that the U.S. Government should also refrain from demonstrating flexibility too soon in the course of crafting an adjusted realignment package palatable to the DPJ Government. On environmental issues, for example, perceptions of U.S. Government flexibility could invite local demands for the U.S. side to permit greater access to bases and to shoulder mitigation costs for environmental damage.

¶13. (S) MOFA DG Umemoto noted that the DPJ leadership was still working out internally its process for deciding on realignment. Foreign Minister Okada had been rigid in his reservation on FRF, and Okinawa State Minister Maehara had been aggressive in ministerial discussions (the latest occurring on October 9), given his claim as an expert on Okinawan issues. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), which Maehara also led, would be a significant player on the realignment review, though

less so in terms of budget outlays for Okinawa. According to Umemoto, the role of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano in the ministerial discussion was also increasingly significant, in light of his close relationship with Prime Minister Hatoyama. Hirano, however, was not versed on Okinawan affairs and appeared to be taking a more legalistic view of the responsibilities shared by the ministries in reaching a decision on realignment. Umemoto added that although Foreign Minister Okada did not wish DPJ power-broker Ichiro Ozawa to play a role on realignment, Ozawa was pondering his possible involvement in the realignment review, given the serious political implications of possible blunders on FRF. Another important factor in the review was the Social Democratic Party (SDP), whose influence in Okinawa would suffer if FRF location issues were resolved. DG Takamizawa added that Ozawa was the only person who could persuade the SDP to change coalition agreements on Okinawa and give the party something in return.

Briefing for Prime Minister's Office

¶14. (C) In an October 13 breakfast, OSD Senior Country Director Basalla, EAP/J Director Maher, the DCM, and POL-MIL Chief also presented the FRF briefing to Tadakatsu Sano and Kanji Yamanouchi, both Executive Assistants to the Prime Minister. Sano focused on the fact that land returns south of Kadena as a part of realignment would reduce the area controlled by U.S. military bases from 19 percent to 12 percent of Okinawa's total land area. He also noted that although the majority of the Japanese public recognized the strategic value of the Alliance, the immediate social challenges and safety concerns faced by the Okinawan people regarding the bases would weigh significantly on the DPJ Government's realignment review. Sano argued that a more immediate solution was required to prevent the possibility of aviation accidents in urban areas, similar to the 2004 U.S. military helicopter crash at an Okinawan university. Sano added that there was "aggravation" at the perception created by the Japanese media that the U.S. side had become inflexible in realignment discussions. The U.S. participants at the breakfast responded that the U.S. Government shared Japanese concerns on aviation safety risks. DCM also commented that U.S. officials would continue to express patience in public about realignment, while relaying private messages to the Japanese government about the serious implications that changes to FRF plans would have for the Alliance.

Participants to October 12 Briefing

¶15. (U)

U.S.:

A/S Kurt Campbell, EAP
DCM James Zumwalt, Embassy Tokyo
DAS David Shear, EAP
DASD for East Asia Michael Schiffer, OSD/APSA
MajGen John Toolan, Deputy Commander, USFJ
Japan Director Kevin Maher, EAP
POL M/C Robert Luke, Embassy Tokyo
Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, OSD/APSA
Consul General Raymond Greene, ConGen Naha
SA Mark Tesone, EAP
COL Jeffrey Wiltse, Director, J-5, USFJ
POL-MIL Chief Joseph Young, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)
Interpreter

Japan:

Akihisa NAGASHIMA, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, MOD
Nobushige TAKAMIZAWA, Director General of Defense Policy, MOD
Motomi INOUE, Director General of Bureau of Local

Cooperation, MOD
Kiyoshi SERIZAWA, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division, MOD
Takafumi FUJII, Director, Director, Okinawa Local
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Taro YAMAOTO, Director, Strategic Planning Office, MOD
Notetaker
Interpreter

Participants to October 12 Lunch

¶16. (U)

U.S.:

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DCM James Zumwalt, Embassy Tokyo
DAS David Shear, EAP
DASD for East Asia Michael Schiffer, OSD/APSA
Japan Director Kevin Maher, EAP
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Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, OSD/APSA

Japan:

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Affairs, MOFA
Nobushige TAKAMIZAWA, Director General of Defense Policy, MOD
Takehiro FUNAKOSHI, Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Division, MOFA
Kiyoshi SERIZAWA, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division, MOD
Hiroyuki NAMAZU, Director, Japan-U.S. SOFA Division, MOFA

Participants to October 13 Breakfast

¶17. (U)

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DCM James Zumwalt, Embassy Tokyo
Japan Director Kevin Maher, EAP
Senior Country Director for Japan Suzanne Basalla, OSD/APSA
POL-MIL Chief Joseph Young, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)

Japan:

Tadakatsu Sano, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister
Kanji Yamanouchi, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister

¶18. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message.

